NATO after Sixty Years: A Stable Crisis

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NATO
AFTER SIXTY YEARS
A STABLE CRISIS

Edited by James Sperling and S. Victor Papacosma
NATO after Sixty Years

A Stable Crisis

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and
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Preface and Acknowledgments

S. Victor Papacosma

This volume has drawn on the papers presented at the conference, “NATO after Sixty Years,” organized by Kent State University’s Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies on April 30 to May 1, 2009. It is the fourth in a series of decennial volumes going back to NATO after thirty years, each of which has examined NATO at critical junctures in its existence—1979, 1989, 1999, 2009—and collectively they contribute to a deeper understanding of what has been termed the enduring alliance. Although unable to participate in the conference, Jamie Shea subsequently contributed a concluding chapter, “What Does NATO’s New Strategic Concept Say about the Future of the Alliance?”

Critical support for the successful organization of the conference and for the editing of this volume came from a number of sources. A grant from NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division helped defray costs, along with funding from Kent State University’s Libraries and Departments of History and Political Science. Carla Weber contributed important administrative services. As always and his emeritus status notwithstanding, Lawrence (Larry) Kaplan played a vital part in this conference, as for so many earlier ones sponsored by the Lemnitzer Center, which he cofounded more than three decades ago. His is literally the enduring spirit and soul of this academic center, although he humbly understated this role in his introductory presentation at the conference, “Reflections on the Lemnitzer Center’s Thirty Years.”

The conference benefited from the participation of James Snyder, from NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, who chaired the introductory session and offered insightful observations “from Brussels.” Other panel chairs included Professor Mary Ann Heiss from Kent State’s Department of History and Professor Michael Nwanze from Howard University, with whom the Lemnitzer Center has collaborated for more than two decades in cosponsoring a National Model NATO in Washington with participation by undergraduates from universities in the United States, Canada, and, most recently, also from the United Kingdom and Italy.

Mark R. Rubin, director emeritus of Kent State’s Center for International Programs and associate director emeritus of the Lemnitzer Center, took part in the conference but is no longer with us. In his many professional and nonprofessional
capacities he parlayed a veritable arsenal of intellectual, organizational, and humanistic assets over the decades. Beneficiaries of his largesse, to include numerous students, are countless. It is only fitting that Mark Rubin, having left such a rich legacy, should have this volume dedicated in his memory.
Three crises presently confront the alliance and its member states. The most persistent crisis stems from the end of the Cold War generally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the enfeeblement of the Russian Federation; namely, what purpose does NATO serve now that there is neither a well-defined adversary, particularly in the European theater, nor an immediate conventional (or even nuclear) threat to the territorial integrity of its member states? This crisis has received the most sustained attention in academic as well as in policy circles. A second crisis facing the alliance is the persistence of the postwar American dissatisfaction with asymmetrical burden sharing within the alliance sharpened by asymmetrical risk sharing, particularly with respect to non–Article 5 operations. Finally, the alliance has also been plagued by persistent crises engendered by the twin processes of adaptation and exaptation by the alliance after 1990: the former required the adaptation of NATO’s collective defense remit to a changed international system and sharing of security competencies with other institutions; the latter has required a renegotiation of the geographic reach of the alliance and the assumption of security tasks unimagined at the time that the Washington Treaty went into effect.

Crises are neither new to the alliance nor have alliance member states failed to resolve or at least mitigate the underlying geostrategic or technological developments that instigated alliance discord.1 Arguably, the steady state of alliance politics is most accurately described as a stable crisis. The question posed in this introductory chapter is a simple one: Why has NATO endured largely unchallenged as the primary security organization for Europeans and North Americans alike given the persistence and intractability of the crises engendered by the processes of adaptation and exaptation in the twenty-first century? Toward providing an initial answer to this question, this chapter first considers whether NATO still functions as a collective defense organization despite the changes that have taken place in the twenty-first century; in other words, has NATO’s institutional identity as a collective defense organization outlived its geostrategic utility or viability? It then considers the
problem of burden- and risk-sharing in an alliance seemingly engaged in long-term and open-ended operations within and outside the North Atlantic area as defined in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty. The final section considers whether the twin strategies of adaptation and exaptation have generated unproductive crises within the alliance or are intrinsic to the alliance's evolution.

A Crisis of Identity: Collective Security, Collective Defense, or Concert?

The lines demarcating concerts, collective defense, and collective security arrangements have been unnecessarily blurred. NATO has been categorized as a security community, collective defense organization, collective security arrangement, and sporadic concert. The classification of NATO as a collective defense arrangement ought to be relatively uncomplicated and uncontested, particularly given Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Alas, this is not the case. NATO’s precise character is muddied by those seeking to press NATO into the pigeonhole of a “security community” based on the confluence of democratic government, a shared civilization, and the expectation that conflicts will be resolved nonviolently. A second barrier to the simple classification of NATO is the fundamental change in the geostrategic context occasioned by the end of the Cold War; NATO was transformed virtually overnight from a compulsory alliance that derived its cohesive power from a well-defined, common Soviet threat to a voluntary alliance with no specific or credible military adversary. Thus the evolution of the Atlantic area initiated the transformation of the NATO security referent from a specific, adversarial “other” into a nonspecific set of milieu goals. That change has denied NATO member states the critical source of negative identity offered by the Soviet threat, has left NATO without an alternative, equally cohesive and threatening “other,” and has reintroduced power into the internal dynamic of the alliance, particularly with respect to determining what constitutes a common milieu goal and the appropriate geographic reach for NATO. The alliance remains outwardly oriented, but the precise target of the alliance and the persistence of a commonly shared perception of threat are uncertain and internal cohesion has been significantly weakened. The question arises: What kind of security governance system does NATO now represent?

Systems of security governance share a comparable set of characteristics: the security referent, which may be directed inwardly toward the contracting states or outwardly toward an “other”; the regulator, which identifies the range of instruments relied on to mitigate systemic conflicts of interest; the interaction context, which refers to the level of amity and enmity in the system, as well as the intensity of the security dilemma; and the normative context, which identifies whether intragroup norms are intrinsic or extrinsic to the calculation of state interests and state behavior. Different values of each constituent element define the various systems of security governance (see Table 1.1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Referent</th>
<th>Regulator</th>
<th>Function of Norms</th>
<th>Interaction Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concert</td>
<td>Multilateral consultation, managed balance of power; war proscribed but viable.</td>
<td>Norms support limited cooperation; defend the status quo and existing domestic regimes; and support the qualified renunciation of war.</td>
<td>Conditional amity; mitigated security dilemma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective defense</td>
<td>Balancing, deterrence, defense, or war.</td>
<td>Alliance norms are substantive and intrinsic to interests along a narrow range of issues.</td>
<td>Amity within group; enmity without; security dilemma in tact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective security</td>
<td>Collective, compulsory adjudication of conflicts; collective enforcement of violations of group norms.</td>
<td>Norms replace sovereign prerogatives in issues of war and peace. Renunciation of war is intrinsically and substantively valued.</td>
<td>Amity; security dilemma resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Atlantic system</td>
<td>Force outside group.</td>
<td>Norms are substantively and intrinsically valued over a narrow range of security issues; there has been a cisatlantic weakening of those norms after September 11.</td>
<td>Strained amity; security dilemma contested.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In a concert, a set of fixed rules and behavioral norms discipline within group balancing: the sovereignty principle is un molested, particularly the formal sovereign equality of status and the principle of noninterference in member-state internal affairs; an (in)formal dispute resolution mechanism exists for brokering intramural conflicts; the contracting states contingently renounce war among themselves; states engage in multilateral consultations on issues of mutual interest; and there is a collective commitment to protect the essential members of the system. The security referent of a concert is inwardly directed, peaceful conflict resolution is (in)formally institutionalized, although the option of war remains; a limited number of substantive norms creates a sense of community and regulates how states interact, and the interaction context is one of contingent amity and a security dilemma muted within the group and idiosyncratic security dilemmas and patterns of amity and enmity outside the group.

A collective defense arrangement, however, only emerges when one group of states identifies another state or group of states as a common threat, and the security referent is outwardly directed. Within group conflicts are mediated by institutionalized procedures of dispute management and decision making, while deterrence and defense mediate conflicts with the adversary. A binding normative framework is required to offset the required abnegation of sovereignty: military forces are likely to be aggregated at some level, defense acquisition and expenditures become a matter of common concern, and strategy is likely to serve the collective rather than the particular interests of its members. Yet, each state retains the right to decide whether an act of aggression has occurred. Moreover, when an act of aggression does occur, the member states have the option, rather than the obligation, to intervene on behalf of their ally. A collective defense arrangement emerges in the context of internal amity and external enmity; a security dilemma vis-à-vis a well-defined adversary provides the arrangement its raison d’être and cohesion.

Collective security differs fundamentally from collective defense. In a collective security arrangement, the security referent is inwardly directed at a contracting state that initiates an act of aggression. Any party to a collective security arrangement is contractually and normatively obligated to assist any other contracting state that is the victim of aggression and to punish the aggressor. A collective security arrangement makes provision for the compulsory adjudication of within-group conflicts. Finally, in a collective security system, the use of force—except in cases warranting immediate self-help measures—must be wielded and legitimized by a quasi-sovereign entity. States, in effect, are required to abnegate a core element of sovereignty; viz., the right to decide the where, when, and why of war. This form of security governance only exists where there is a strong prohibitionary norm against war and an interaction context characterized by amity and a moribund security dilemma.
State Attributes in the Euro-Atlantic Geopolitical Space

Four state attributes—identity, interests, sovereign control, and use of force—demarcate the range viable security arrangements in which any given state will participate (see Table 1.2). These attributes neither manifest themselves in fixed relationships nor individually exert an unvarying explanatory power, although the range of values assessed for any one attribute is likely to set the boundary conditions for the others. Over the course of the postwar period, positive identity formation between the states of North America and Europe as well as within Europe itself was facilitated by democratic governments and a shared civilization, both of which were reinforced by the legitimizing rhetoric of NATO and the EU. The

Table 1.2. The Atlantic Alliance: State Attributes and System Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Attributes</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Sovereign Control</th>
<th>Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>National, but underpinned by a weak notion of community</td>
<td>Common, overlapping, and broad</td>
<td>Largely retained in security affairs, but largely lost in areas related to the economy</td>
<td>Not within area, but out of area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Joint and very broad</td>
<td>Largely lost</td>
<td>No; reliance on persuasion and compromise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Properties</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Sovereign Recognition</th>
<th>Normative Framework</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>Residual role</td>
<td>Compromised and shared within NATO integrated military structure</td>
<td>Very deep in defense, but narrow range of issues and voluntary compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>No role</td>
<td>Pooled; compromised</td>
<td>Very deep, broad, binding; adjudication of conflicts with expectation of voluntary compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
common identity shared within the Atlantic was initially “negative” insofar as the glue holding NATO together was the common Soviet military threat and the fear of communist political success at the polls in western European states. Europe’s common identity was also initially negative; it not only consisted of the external threat posed by the Soviet Union and internal threat posed by national communist parties, but also by a fear of a renascent Germany. While the Europeans and Americans have shared a commitment to liberal democracy, elites manufactured a common European and American identity, where arguably only a contingent one exists: the American identity remains pristinely national, whereas the NATO member states that are in the EU possess in different measure a muddied identity that is both national and European.

The most conspicuous characteristic these states share is the loss of sovereign control. Economic and political interdependence were postwar American and European foreign policy objectives. The European states have ceded control over most aspects of economic management to the EU (with the critical exception of fiscal policy), individual economic agents, and the European Central Bank (ECB). The real and financial sectors of the EU economies are fully integrated, a process begun in earnest with the Single European Act (1986). The euro has replaced national currencies in most EU member states, the ECB rather than national central banks sets monetary policy, and the recent economic crisis has placed pressure on European institutions to assume, and national governments to abnegate, responsibility for fiscal policy. The integration of the North American and European economies is likewise broad and deep. Trade in manufactured goods is free from high tariffs, capital markets are integrated, the euro and dollar are the world’s two major transaction and investment currencies, and prior to September 11, 2001, personal travel across the Atlantic faced few administrative hindrances. Philosophical design and technological default reinforced these interdependencies: the privileging of the individual vis-à-vis the state and the ubiquity of cyberspace and other forms of electronic communication constrain further these states’ ability to monitor or control individual actions.

The national calculus of interest reveals the largest divergence within the Euro-Atlantic region. The European states have opted to create or at least strive for a common foreign and security policy, a European security and defense policy, and an entire range of common policies along its periphery and beyond. The United States retains an almost exclusively national calculus for arriving at its definition of interest, a tendency evident during the Clinton and Obama administrations, and the hallmark of the Bush administration. The European definition of interest, however, has been progressively denationalized within specific spheres of activity, particularly the promotion of democracy and market economies in their “neighborhood,” and partially consists of an agreed on and well-demarcated zone of security responsibility along its periphery. Traditional security concerns re-
Introduction

main national at some fundamental level, but even here the solidarity clause of the Lisbon Treaty represents an important step toward replacing the national with the European interest.

The transatlantic area is free from the intramural use of force. Only the United Kingdom and France actively seek a power projection capability; the other EU states have been relatively content to rely on “civilian” instruments of statecraft, which in their view are not only normatively preferable, but are also the more effective means for ameliorating the security threats to Europe. This normative virtue has become a material necessity with the current fiscal crisis of the European states; not only Germany but the United Kingdom have introduced austerity budgets that will reduce defense expenditures on force projection capabilities and modernization into the medium term. In contrast, the Obama administration’s defense budget is set to rise from $636.5 billion in 2009 to $718.8 billion in 2012. As important, American expenditures on the nonmilitary requirements of security have been and remain substantial.

System Characteristics in the Euro-Atlantic Geopolitical Space

System properties establish the range of viable security governance outcomes available for any group of states (see Table 1.2). Any form of security governance is shaped by four system properties: the role of power in ordering relations between states, the attachment to the sovereignty principle, the breadth and depth of shared norms, and the legitimacy of war. Despite the economic and military power wielded by individual EU states, institutional arrangements have muted the impact of power asymmetries on policy outcomes. In the transatlantic area, the United States acts in accordance with the prerogatives that its power confers upon it. NATO’s integrated military command has placed a mild constraint on the American exercise of power, but a significant one on the Europeans—the Berlin-plus arrangements, for example, provide the United States with a real constraint on European military operations owing to a potential veto over the use of NATO military assets, whereas the United States retains the ability to act unilaterally despite the preferences of its NATO allies. Thus, within the transatlantic context two contrary dynamics exist: a growing reliance upon democratic decision making in the EU tenuously linked to the traditional measures of power and intra-alliance relations still mediated by the sometimes raw exercise of power.

Norms in the European political space have become institutionalized as hard law. The institutionalization of norms is more developed within Europe than within the alliance; it would be difficult to argue that international norms consistently constrain American behavior or define its interests with regard to matters of security. Norms play very different roles on either side of the Atlantic. Arguably, norms constitute European interests across a broad spectrum of policy issues,
while norms are only valued instrumentally and remain peripheral to the definition of American interests. The role of war as an instrument for conflict resolution in the Euro-Atlantic region may be summarily dismissed; there is presently no conceivable set of circumstances that could serve as a casus belli between Europe and the United States.

**NATO as a System of Security Governance**

The confluence of systemic characteristics and state attributes within the North Atlantic suggests that NATO has devolved from an unqualified collective defense arrangement—despite the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty—into a sporadic concert *outside* the geographic scope of responsibility identified in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty (see Table 1.1).

The regulator of conflict within the alliance is highly institutionalized within the North Atlantic Council and more importantly within the integrated command structure. Deterring war and relying on force to address “common” security problems was the core function of NATO, but in the changed environment that consensus has weakened, with respect to what constitutes a security threat, where those threats originate, and what are the most effective instruments to address them. During the Cold War, the western Europeans and Americans alike relied on military force to deter a Soviet attack and actively prepared for war within the North Atlantic area; conflicts of interest over how those goals would be best met were resolved within the NATO unified command or between the member governments within the institutionalized forum provided by the North Atlantic Council.

The sovereignty principle was asymmetrically compromised within that framework. The Europeans by and large yielded to American preferences out of necessity rather than conviction, particularly on the use of nuclear weapons and the most effective strategy for deterring the Soviet Union. Although some argue that the alliance shared a common identity, which would imply an undifferentiated understanding of threat and response, state interests were in fact highly differentiated outside the North Atlantic area. Even though the allies were dedicated to the goal of deterring the Soviet Union, the Europeans hoped that if deterrence failed the subsequent nuclear exchange would take place over their heads, while the United States was determined that a nuclear exchange would first occur on European soil. That conflict of interest was resolved largely in America’s favor owing to its preponderance of power; after the Cold War similar fissures within the alliance over strategy are not so easily contained as demonstrated by the division within the alliance over Iraq and the fraying of the consensus on the necessity of the NATO operation in Afghanistan.

The norms embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty are intrinsic and substantive to the calculation of interest on both sides of the Atlantic over a narrow range
of issues. Norms have been endowed with these characteristics despite the relative strength of the sovereignty principle within the treaty itself and the marked American tendency to identify its interests according to a national rather than collective referent. The absence of force as an instrument for resolving intramural disputes created an environment that allowed the transformation of instrumental norms created in the early 1950s into substantive norms constituting member-state definitions of interest. The substantive quality of NATO norms for its member states was demonstrated, for example, with the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The plausible insularity of the European allies from a similar attack did not deter them from invoking Article 5 for the first time in the alliance’s history, removing the Taliban from power, and then committing to the pacification and occupation of post-Taliban Afghanistan. This chain of events demonstrates that the collective defense obligation in the North Atlantic Treaty is an intrinsic norm.

Amity interrupted by occasional fits of pique defines the NATO interaction context. There is no security dilemma within the alliance; controversy does exist, however, on what constitutes a threat, the sources of those threats, the best means of addressing those threats, and the geographic reach of the alliance. These kinds of controversies existed during the Cold War, but multiplied after 1992. Russia is unlikely to emerge as a geostrategic “other” that would reintroduce a renewed source of negative identity capable of holding the alliance together.

Summary

The durability of NATO as a collective defense organization may be attributed to the postwar confluence of common interests, common values, and a manufactured common identity, even though positive and negative identities coexisted. NATO falls short of meeting fully the requirements of a security community or a collective security organization. Although it may have appeared to have been more than a collective defense arrangement during the postwar period, developments within NATO since 2001 in particular have revealed schisms that are deep and probably enduring. The NATO states are democracies, and there is no conceivable circumstance under which they would resort to war with one another. But the selective participation of NATO allies in different peacekeeping missions, the temporary crisis attending the invasion of Iraq, and the slow fraying of the coalition in Afghanistan also suggest that NATO is developing a dual identity: an inwardly directed collective defense organization without a specific or likely enemy and an outwardly directed concert—or coalition of the willing—pursuing disputed milieu goals.
The burden-sharing debate in NATO has been as persistent as the alliance has been resilient. In the early decades of the alliance, the controversy derived from two distinct processes. The first reflected the requirement that NATO possess a credible conventional balance vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact and the European allies would contribute a proportional share of combat forces to the common defense in order that the United States would enjoy a greater degree of freedom outside the North Atlantic area to execute its global strategy of containment (notably on the Korean peninsula in the early 1950s and then in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s). And the second reflected the more parochial concern with the American balance of payments deficit, the European portion of which successive American administrations directly attributed to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Europe, the sustainability of the dollar as the key currency in the international system, and the overall stability of the American-designed Bretton Woods international economic system. The burden-sharing debate not only continued but became more divisive in the post–Cold War era; it has been conjoined to a new resentment about risk-sharing, a muted concern during the Cold War.

**Burden-Sharing**

During the Cold War, the perennial NATO burden-sharing debate focused on the inventory of member-state armed forces and compared shares of gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to defense as well as relative personnel, equipment, and R&D expenditures. The rising saliency of out-of-area operations and the requisite need for force projection capabilities have redefined the terms of this debate. After 1990, the United States effectively demanded a restructuring of allied forces toward acquiring force projection capabilities, achieving interoperability with American armed forces (rather than American interoperability with those of Europe), enhancing the deployability and sustainability of forces outside national territory, and conducting operations along the entire conflict spectrum. The seeming failure of certain European NATO allies to meet successive force-generation goals for conducting operations in Afghanistan has intensified American dissatisfaction with disproportional burden-sharing within the alliance. Does that dissatisfaction withstand empirical scrutiny?

The empirical foundation for determining the presence or absence of intra-alliance (in)equities cannot simply be restricted to the ISAF operation or include the operation in Iraq (an American-led operation that faced the resistance of key NATO allies); NATO operations elsewhere must be included since these, by necessity, require a dispersal of national and alliance efforts. To these operations
should be added European efforts along its periphery and in regions of the world where the United States has failed to lead or has implicitly delegated responsibility to the Europeans for regional security governance, notably in Africa. The changed nature of NATO operations, or rather the interdependency of military operations with the civilian tasks of policing and economic reconstruction, constitutes a second facet of any comprehensive analysis of burden-sharing within the alliance; consequently, it requires consideration of financial contributions alongside any inventory of committed military assets.

There have been three major NATO stabilization operations between 2002 and 2009: SFOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), KFOR (Kosovo), and ISAF (Afghanistan). NATO has also conducted two training missions (NTM-Iraq and NTM-Afghanistan) and naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavor) and Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia (Operations Allied Provider, Allied Protector, and Ocean Shield). EU member-state contributions to SFOR (and the follow-on EUFOR Althea) and KFOR have dwarfed those of the United States, while the European NATO member-state contributions to the UN-mandated and NATO-led ISAF were only exceeded by those of the United States in 2009, a trend that is likely to continue: the surge initiated by the Obama administration in 2010 in conjunction with the planned withdrawals of the Dutch, Polish, and Italian contributions as well as the uncertain future participation of Germany (and possibly the UK) will increasingly shift the burden onto the United States (see Table 1.3).  

In addition to European contributions to these NATO operations must be added the Europeans’ disproportionately large contributions to the two training missions

Table 1.3. Allied Contributions to NATO Operations (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NATO Europe (%)</th>
<th>U.S. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>KFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate share</td>
<td>85.89</td>
<td>89.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of effort</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as to naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean to suppress Somali piracy: European NATO and non-NATO EU member-state navies account for ten of the thirteen ships committed to Operation Active Endeavor, nine of the thirteen ships dedicated to Operations Allied Provider and Allied Protector in 2008, and five of nine ships participating in Operation Ocean Shield. These operations, and the Europeans’ preponderant contributions to each of them, strongly suggest that the two major roles ascribed to NATO—collective defense and the linkage of American and European security—continue to enjoy a high degree of legitimacy.

The European member states of NATO have also furthered NATO milieu goals via participation in seven autonomous EU military operations and twenty civil-military or civilian operations between 2002 and 2009. The number of European personnel committed to EU or NATO military operations between 2002 and 2009 ranged from a low of 28,948 (in 2005) to a high of 43,348 (in 2008). The number of personnel committed to civilian operations rose from 110 (in 2002) to a high of 2,687 (in 2008) (see Table 1.4). The aggregated European and American contributions to NATO and EU missions operating under a UN mandate reveal that the Europeans have contributed well over 50 percent of the personnel to those missions between 2002 and 2008, whereas the aggregate U.S. share during that period peaked at 36 percent in 2006. The European share of the military burden in these operations only slipped under 50 percent and the U.S. share only exceeded 50 percent in 2009 with the onset of the Obama administration’s decision to initiate a military surge in Afghanistan. Over the period 2002–2009, however, the Europeans provided almost 70 percent of the personnel committed to NATO and EU missions conducted under a UN mandate. As important, the European burden-sharing index (personnel share/GNI share) has exceeded unity, whether the measure is the individual contributions to the three major NATO operations (see Table 1.3) or combined contributions to EU and NATO operations (see Table 1.5). Similarly, the U.S. burden-sharing index only approached or exceeded unity for one NATO mission (ISAF) and for contributions to UN-mandated missions in the year 2009. These results indicate that Europe has over-contributed to these operations, while the United States has under-contributed to them.

Allied financial contributions to the task of reconstructing and stabilizing Afghanistan and the Balkans present another measure of alliance burden-sharing. Multilateral facilities and bilateral overseas development assistance constitute the two primary categories of financial support given to the Afghan government. The United States is the Afghan government’s primary source of financial support (see Table 1.6). Over the period 2002–2013, the United States will provide approximately 75 percent of the $48.46 billion pledged to the Afghan government; it has disbursed $23.42 billion (79 percent) of the $29.62 billion received by the Afghan government. The Europeans will provide approximately 21 percent of the financial
Table 1.4. European Military and Civilian Personnel Committed to UN-Mandated EU and NATO Missions

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO military operations</strong></td>
<td>39,383</td>
<td>32,992</td>
<td>30,603</td>
<td>23,262</td>
<td>31,396</td>
<td>34,697</td>
<td>37,952</td>
<td>37,509</td>
<td>267,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU military operations</strong></td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>5,802</td>
<td>5,686</td>
<td>7,613</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>5,396</td>
<td>4,844</td>
<td>4,235</td>
<td>33,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total military</strong></td>
<td>39,671</td>
<td>38,794</td>
<td>36,289</td>
<td>30,875</td>
<td>33,610</td>
<td>39,053</td>
<td>42,797</td>
<td>41,743</td>
<td>301,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU civil-military operations</strong></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>2,687</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>9,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total personnel commitments</strong></td>
<td>39,781</td>
<td>39,906</td>
<td>37,154</td>
<td>31,882</td>
<td>34,129</td>
<td>39,686</td>
<td>45,484</td>
<td>44,053</td>
<td>310,880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.5. Allied Contributions to NATO and EU Missions with a UN Mandate (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td>92.07</td>
<td>84.13</td>
<td>90.16</td>
<td>88.15</td>
<td>59.77</td>
<td>66.90</td>
<td>64.17</td>
<td>45.81</td>
<td>68.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burden-sharing index</strong></td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>11.34</td>
<td>7.39</td>
<td>8.83</td>
<td>36.09</td>
<td>29.96</td>
<td>31.74</td>
<td>51.12</td>
<td>28.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burden-sharing index</strong></td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
assistance over the same period and have dispersed $6.20 billion of total allied financial support. The American and European burden-sharing index (1.44 and .38, respectively) make clear that the United States is carrying a disproportionately large share of the financial burden attending the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan. This asymmetry of effort cannot be considered in isolation, however, of the allied financial contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of the Balkans after 1999.

The American share of the total allied official development assistance (ODA) to southeastern Europe ranged from just under 26 percent in 2004 to just under 10 percent in 2008; the combined European share (European Union and bilateral member-state aid) of ODA to the region ranged from just over 74 percent in 2004 to over 90 percent in 2008. The aggregate U.S. and European financial assistance to this region between 2000 and 2008 was $4.89 billion (a 20.42 percent share) and $19.05 billion (a 79.58 percent share), respectively. And their respective burden-sharing index is 0.22 and 1.53. The United States and European efforts in Afghanistan and southeast Europe, if treated separately, virtually mirror the other. However, the aggregate allied financial aid supporting the reconstruction and stabilization of the Balkans and Afghanistan provides an accurate basis for comparing the total European and American efforts to stabilize regions considered critical to allied security. Unlike the asymmetrical commitment of military personnel, the aggregated financial contribution of the Americans and Europeans indicates a roughly proportional sharing of the financial burden: the U.S. share is just under 53 percent (with a corresponding burden-sharing index of 1.2), and the European share is just over 47 percent (with a burden-sharing index of .91).

Risk-Sharing

Differences in exposure to risk have marked the alliance throughout its history. Although the Europeans faced the greater and more immediate risk of a conventional or limited nuclear war, each member state accepted that the Soviet Union posed a common existential threat. With the shift to a more variegated threat environment after the Cold War and, more specifically, repeated NATO expeditionary operations in response to them, asymmetries of risk in those operations have become a deeply and publicly divisive issue. The risk-sharing debate has been largely restricted to combat operations in Afghanistan and is not restricted to American complaints about its European allies. Canada and some European governments, notably those in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK, have been publicly critical of those European allies avoiding counterterrorism operations and imposing national caveats restricting participation in allied operations. Former American Defense Secretary Robert Gates, meanwhile, claimed that the risk avoidance inherent in national caveats foreshadowed a two-tier alliance where
Table 1.6. Aid to Afghanistan and Southeastern Europe, 2002–2008 (billions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burden-sharing index</th>
<th>Aid to Afghanistan</th>
<th>ODA to Southeastern Europe</th>
<th>Total aid</th>
<th>Burden-sharing index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Share (%)</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Share (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>23.42</td>
<td>79.07</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>20.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>20.93</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>79.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.7. Risk-Sharing in Afghanistan, 2002–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualty share (%)</td>
<td>GNI share (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>60.66</td>
<td>43.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>29.70</td>
<td>51.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC s/e</td>
<td>20.27</td>
<td>17.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC n/w/k</td>
<td>9.43</td>
<td>33.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

some allies do the fighting while others stand aside. This asymmetry, accounting as it does for the national expenditure of blood in pursuit of common security objectives, has not only divided North America and Europe but Europe itself.

Risk has three separable dimensions: the stationing of troops in “safe” as opposed to “dangerous” regional commands within Afghanistan, the number of combat deaths, and the numerous national caveats that keep national forces out of harm’s way. By common consent, the most unstable, contested regions of Afghanistan are in ISAF Regional Commands South and East (RC s/e), particularly those provinces along the Afghan-Pakistani border. ISAF forces operating in the southern provinces are drawn from Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Romania, the Netherlands, and the UK (Regional Command South), while those operating in the eastern provinces are drawn primarily from the Czech Republic, Turkey, and the United States (Regional Command East). ISAF troops operating in the relatively stable western and northern provinces are drawn from Italy, Spain, and Lithuania (Regional Command West) and Germany, Hungary, and Norway (Regional Command North), while French troops are assigned to Kabul (Regional Command Capital).

Although British, Canadian, and American armed forces accounted for 86.18 percent of the 1,918 combat-related deaths in Afghanistan between October 2001 and July 2010, there is a marked difference in the casualty rates of NATO allies that is linked to the area of operational responsibility. Between 2002 and 2009, those forces operating in RC s/e accounted for more than 90 percent of the combat fatalities, while those operating in Regional Commands North, West, and Command Capital (RC n/w/cc) accounted for the balance. Rather than merely assessing the raw number of combat fatalities as a measure of risk-sharing, a more reliable and useful measure of risk compares the share of combat deaths to the share of national troops deployed. On this measure, the risk index of those allies operating in RC s/e exceeded unity, while those operating in RC n/w/cc were significantly lower at 0.29 (see Table 1.7). From the perspective of assessing the differentiated level of risk assumed by the North American and European allies, the North American risk index was 1.45, while that of European was 0.58. The disparity of risk between the North American and European allies has narrowed, however: in 2009, the European risk index rose to .75 and again in the first half of 2010 to .90. With the notable exception of the Netherlands, those national forces operating in RC s/e are clearly exposing themselves to a much greater risk of combat death than forces operating elsewhere.

National caveats on the use of national forces have been characterized as intralliance “burden-shifting” as well as “cancers” on operational effectiveness. A NATO Parliamentary Assembly report identified sixty-two national caveats, forty-five of which have negatively impacted ISAF operations. The caveats with operational significance include those that ban nighttime operations, restrict the geographic mobility of national forces, require consultations with national capitals
when making tactical decisions, exclude specific categories of activity (notably, counterterrorism operations), and prohibit the helicopter transport of ANA forces or fighting after a snowfall. These caveats generally reflect the difficult domestic political contexts that allied leaders must negotiate in order to make any meaningful contribution to the allied effort, a domestic challenge facing virtually every member state with a significant troop commitment to ISAF. Nonetheless, those national caveats minimize the risk of combat-related deaths and have shifted the burden of high-intensity warfare onto American, Australian, British, and Canadian forces, along with those from Denmark, the Netherlands, and a few of the eastern European NATO states.

**Crises of Institutional Adaptation and Exaptation in the Twenty-First Century**

NATO functions today as a collective defense organization without a well-defined adversary capable of posing an existential threat to allied security and as a sporadic concert manifested in “coalitions of the (un)willing” outside Europe broadly defined. This emerging duality of purpose raises an important question: What accounts for the growing incoherence of the NATO identity as a security organization and the concomitant loss of an agreed on and binding strategic purpose? The various realist strains of international relations theory would attribute NATO’s persistence or imminent demise or dysfunction to an essentially unchanged or profoundly altered balance of power, divergent or convergent threat assessments, or a stable or changing balance of interests. The difficulties besetting these competing realist analyses of NATO are twofold. First, the evidence marshaled to demonstrate a change in the balance of power, threat, or interests is inevitably plagued by irreconcilable counterfactuals owing to the three factors: the fluidity of the current international system, particularly with respect to the measurement and assessment of the shift in the balance of power that inevitably occurred with the demise of the Soviet Union (and the decline of Russia as a military power); the rising regional and global economic and strategic importance of China and India; and the indeterminate impact of this broader systemic change on Europe (and the individual European states) as a security actor. And second, the rising complexity of the concept of security—the rising salience of the asymmetric threats posed to western states by nonstate actors, the broadening of the security agenda, and the deepening concern with a disparate set of milieu goals—has similarly created ambiguities in any analysis of individual national assessments of strategic threat and interest.

The continuing viability of NATO as a collective defense organization within the North Atlantic region in conjunction with the presence of manifest common security challenges confronting NATO member states outside it suggest that the crises of identity and collective action currently plaguing NATO are the product
of two concurrent processes, institutional adaptation and exaptation. The continuing viability of NATO as the transatlantic link binding Europe and the United States as well as the ability of NATO to execute the current challenges of regional and global security governance are contingent upon the successful execution of both processes.

In evolutionary biology, adaptation explains the acquisition of characteristics allowing an organism to survive and reproduce through the process of natural selection. Adaptation is a specific response to the demands of the external environment, has an identifiable historical origin, and over time produces the best fit between the environmental demands and function. NATO’s function as a collective defense organization, for example, was a direct response to the postwar international system and its institutional elaboration provided the best fit between the security needs of the allies and functional capabilities of the institution. The process of adaptation in NATO over the course of the postwar period was and remains the preservation of the alliance’s ability to execute two functions: collective defense and nuclear deterrence. The endurance of NATO—and the strategic conflicts within the alliance on how to execute NATO’s functions—may be ascribed in large part to the evolutionary process for resolving those challenges to NATO’s survival and viability in a changed and changing international system.

The challenge of resolving the twin crises of identity and burden-sharing reflects the process of exaptation, the cooptation of the historical function of NATO as a collective defense organization and as the institutional manifestation of the linkage between America and Europe to cope with a number of the fundamental changes: the invalidation of the primacy of territorial defense as understood in the Washington Treaty, the ill-defined boundaries of the common zone of security that are outside that demarcated in Article 6 the Washington Treaty, the precise origin and nature of threats, and uncertainty over the appropriateness of NATO as the vehicle for responding to those threats. The alliance, in redefining its purpose and nature, has called into question the viability of the original contract binding the allies together and their mutual rights and responsibilities. These changes have manifested themselves in a process of exaptation that has engendered conflicts qualitatively unlike those that periodically emerged after 1949.

There are two forms of exaptation: the first occurs when an institutional feature originally developed for one function is coopted for another (e.g., the cooptation of the intra-alliance consultation on regional strategic matters in order to create the basis for intra-alliance consultation on global strategic matters); the second category occurs when a dormant institutional feature inessential to its survival is coopted to meet a current challenge (e.g., the use of the general language in Article 2 to augment the narrower responsibility for collective defense with the notion of comprehensive security with a strong civilian component). Exaptation, therefore, occurs when an already existing institutional feature is seized on and
modified in order to perform a specific role that was not essential or intrinsic to the institution’s primary function; in the case of NATO, collective defense and nuclear deterrence.

The process of adaptation is most evident in NATO efforts to deter the acquisition or use of a nuclear or a ballistic missile capability enabling a potential adversary to strike NATO territory. NATO member states now generally assume that any state acquiring such a capability would be more difficult to deter owing to the assessment that the likely candidate states are rogue powers. The decision to acquire a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability meets the new strategic and operational demands of the alliance, particularly the twin foundational functions of nuclear deterrence and collective defense. A second adaptation has been the enhancement of the Article 4 responsibilities of the alliance and the broadened redefinition of the North Atlantic area covered by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty. This adaptation—even if the outer boundaries of the North Atlantic area remain ambiguous—has made possible the robust peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in the Balkans attending the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. These adaptations, despite the debates surrounding the precise path and nature of institutional change, were contained owing to the underlying compatibility of those adaptations with the preexisting provisions of the Washington Treaty. The operation in Afghanistan, however, represents a process of exaptation: the operation clearly falls outside the operational area defined in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty and despite the invocation of Article 5, the UN-mandated NATO operation was initially tasked with the goal of stabilizing Kabul. The United States bypassed NATO and opted for an American-led coalition of the willing engaged in high-intensity and counterinsurgency combat operations. Just as the debates over the peacekeeping and peacemaking roles and BMD required the adaptation of preexisting agreements on the purpose of NATO codified in the Washington Treaty and postwar practice, the operation in Afghanistan—as the asymmetrical participation of NATO allies in ISAF—demonstrate the absence of a similarly sound institutional foundation for cooption. Consequently, ISAF and OEF have strained the alliance without producing a consensus on the role of NATO outside the geopolitical space of the redefined Article 6.

The potential expansion of the geographical reach and responsibility of the alliance outside Europe is a second policy challenge facing NATO. These two challenges were initially set in motion by Senator Richard Lugar’s quip that NATO must go out of area or out of business in response to the Balkan conflicts. But the Bush administration exacerbated the intra-alliance debate when it pushed for the globalization of NATO post–September 11. The globalization of NATO—or at least its strategic encroachment into regions far removed from any reasonable definition of the North Atlantic area—is predicated on the process of securitization of domestic infrastructure (counterterrorism), failed states (regional instability), and economic
dislocation (a secure supply of energy), among others. There is no contractual basis in the Washington Treaty for NATO to accommodate this process of securitization, other than a reinterpretation of Article 2, initially designed for the purpose of consultation on geostrategic matters impinging on the postwar bipolar European order.

Thus, the process of securitization, the conflation of those new security threats with the collective defense function of the alliance, and the location of those threats far outside the North Atlantic area represent a process of exaptation, particularly as NATO locates security threats and seeks an offsetting role in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean or in the Black Sea region, the stability of the latter a central security concern for Turkey, a NATO ally and potentially Christendom’s strategic interlocutor with the Muslim world. The engagement with and the search for a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation represents, by contrast, a process of adaptation within the alliance; engagement is fully consistent with the articles of the Washington Treaty and the postwar practice of strategic cooperation (or at least interaction) with the Soviet Union. Similarly, a more robust NATO role in the southern and eastern Mediterranean would simply adapt NATO to the process of enlargement, the littoral responsibilities of many NATO member states, and generally confluent strategic interests in the region.

NATO’s role as a security actor is tempered by its position in a dense network of overlapping security institutions—the UN, OSCE, and EU—contributing to European security governance. These other institutions are important owing to their compensatory roles vis-à-vis a NATO alliance that suffers instrumental disabilities (virtually nonexistent civilian-crisis capabilities) and legitimacy challenges (many allied member states have either the constitutional or the domestic political requirement that participation in military operations can only be sanctioned with a UN or OSCE mandate). The post–Cold War process of seeking greater integration of NATO into the UN system of global security governance represents a process of adaptation: Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, for example, provides that NATO did not detract from “the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Thus, the framework for integrating the UN into the NATO system of security governance in the North Atlantic area was established at the outset, although that has not resolved intra-alliance conflicts over the desired and possible degrees of autonomy that NATO enjoys vis-à-vis the UN.

NATO’s relationship with the OSCE constitutes yet another example of institutional adaptation to a changed international environment brought about by the end of the Cold War, although the process of institutional adaptation has revolved around the OSCE finding a role in the European security system as NATO sought to become a pan-European institution via enlargement and its partnerships with the former member states of the Soviet Union. The integration of the OSCE into the NATO-sponsored security order was facilitated by its legacy as a creature of
the Cold War, the special competencies developed by the OSCE for the tasks of conflict prevention and postconflict rehabilitation, and the ability of the OSCE to operate in regions where a NATO intervention would be unwelcomed, by either the target state or the Russian Federation.

The complementary and competitive EU-NATO relationship is the most complex and represents a process of exaptation: the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was originally mooted as a means to enhance Europe's ability to assume the task of peacekeeping and peacemaking in Europe with the United States playing a supporting role at best. The ESDI was to be developed within the institutional framework of the Western European Union (WEU), which would serve as the institutional bridge ensuring NATO's primacy. The Balkan conflicts, in conjunction with the European desire to emerge as a global actor commensurate with its interests and capabilities, led instead to the EU-anchored European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), thereby posing a potential long-term challenge to NATO primacy. The institutional arrangements established to facilitate European access to NATO assets under the aegis of the ESDI were transferred to the ESDP with the Berlin-plus arrangements. This shift of institutional location initially reflected the transfer of WEU competencies to the EU in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The potential EU challenge to NATO as the primary institutional address for European security governance was sealed with the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, which included a solidarity clause akin to Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty and the termination of the Brussels Treaty in 2010. The emergence of the EU as an autonomous military actor and the process of reconciling that role with NATO's present primacy can be partially attributed to the exaptation of the institutional relationship between NATO and the WEU to that of NATO and the EU.

Conclusion

NATO after Sixty Years collectively addresses these challenges of adaptation and exaptation that will persist into the early twenty-first century. Each chapter sheds light on the difficulties of NATO's adjustment to the plethora of post–Cold War security challenges that have emerged inside and outside its traditional and treaty-based responsibilities and competencies. The first set of essays explores how NATO has coped with the changed operational and strategic purposes of the alliance: Sean Kay examines the problem of sustaining the deterrent capability and collective defense function of the alliance, particularly the debate over ballistic missile defense (BMD); Mark Webber considers the expanded role of NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and its implications for NATO as a military alliance; and Stanley Kober considers the negative impact of Afghanistan on alliance solidarity and credibility.
The second set addresses the expanded geographical reach and responsibility of the alliance. Melvin Goodman traces the engagement of the alliance with the Russian Federation, particularly the postulated strategic error of enlargement along the Russian periphery; Yannis A. Stivachtis explores the NATO role in the southern and eastern Mediterranean; Stephen J. Blank considers allied interests in the Black Sea region and the potential liabilities and benefits of an active NATO engagement in a region that remains conceptually ill-defined; and Nathan Lucas provides a skeptical analysis of NATO’s ability and need to claim the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean as a strategic area of operational responsibility.

The final chapters place NATO into the institutional context that will shape NATO’s evolution as a security actor in the new geostrategic context and threat environment. Lawrence S. Kaplan establishes the potential role of NATO as an agent for the UN in difficult peacekeeping and peacemaking operations; Dennis J. D. Sandole focuses on the complementary relationship between the OSCE and NATO, particularly the institutional expertise of the OSCE in dealing with the humanitarian aspects of postconflict interventions; and Stanley Sloan focuses on NATO’s fraught institutional relationship with the EU, particularly the emergence of the latter as an effective security actor across the entire spectrum of the new security agenda.

In the concluding chapter, Jamie Shea addresses the difficulty of sustaining NATO’s relevance into the twenty-first century against the backdrop of the “New Strategic Concept.” He describes the difficulties of crafting a new strategic concept that will ensure NATO’s continuing viability and credibility as the primary security institution for the nations of the North Atlantic area. The evidence provided by the contributors to this volume provides the basis for guarded optimism that NATO will persist and continue to perform its twin functions of collective defense and deterrence into the foreseeable future. NATO may be in a perpetual state of crisis, but it is a stable one.

Notes


13. See the contributing chapters to Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, eds., *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010); and idem,


18. This argument was first presented in James Sperling and Mark Webber, “NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul,” *International Affairs*, 85:3 (2009), 491–512. The assessment of burden-sharing within the alliance in Afghanistan is complicated by the American Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which was conducted alongside the NATO-led ISAF. In 2002–3, the Europeans contributed almost 60 percent of the troops to ISAF, while the U.S. share was just under 2 percent, the corresponding contributions to OEF were 24 percent and 68 percent, respectively. By 2008, the U.S. share of forces dedicated to OEF rose to 97 percent with the Europeans accounting for the remainder; and the European and American share of total forces dedicated to OEF and ISAF in 2008 amounted to just under 38 percent and just over 58 percent, respectively. A full accounting can be found in Sperling and Webber, “NATO,” 505, Table 2.


20. NATO, “Counter-piracy Operations” (Brussels: NATO, 2009), http://tinyurl.com/7p0qk68.

21. These figures are net of the Canadian financial contributions.


26. In Table 1.5, I have used GNI share as a proxy for troop share owing to the volatility of force shares over the time period 2002–9.

27. The national risk-sharing indexes can be found in Sperling and Webber, “NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul,” *International Affairs* 85:3 (2009), 508, Table 4.


References


